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plete discussion of Ovid. The *Metamorphoses* is treated on pages 314-316.

Allinson, Anne C. E. *Roads from Rome*. (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1913).

In THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 5.25-26 (October 28, 1911), there was given an abstract of a paper, entitled *A Poet's Toll*, which had been published in The Atlantic Monthly for December, 1910, and was later incorporated in this delightful book (pages 37-71). This paper had to do with Propertius. In *Roads from Rome*, under the caption *A Roman Citizen*, Mrs. Allinson deals with Ovid (107-143).

She begins with a charming description of how Ovid's family—his wife Fabia, his daughter Perilla, his son-in-law Fidus Cornelius, and his grandchild—were all celebrating Ovid's fifty-second birthday. The second part of the paper (118-130) deals with the blow that, at the very moment when all seemed bright for "the chief poet of Rome", as his daughter fondly calls him, came, without warning, in the news that he had been banished to Tomi—driven out from Rome, yes, but an exile? No, he wildly maintains, for he was still *A Roman Citizen*, with his property and his rights, his wife and his daughter. The effect of the blow on Ovid is most skilfully portrayed.

In Part III (130-143) Mrs. Allinson brings us on to a point two years later than the sentence of banishment. At first she invites us to tarry awhile with Ovid in far-off Tomi. Then (134-143) she brings us back to Rome, to Fabia, a descendant of the three hundred and six Fabii who, at the river Cremera, fought for Rome till every one of them was dead, a Fabia schooled by two years of suffering, who had come to understand her husband, herself, and her country all the better for the suffering.

... Had the hard, solitary fight to be brave meant nothing except that she could write her husband stimulating letters and help his child to take up again the joys of youth? She had found and tested powers in herself that were not Ovid's. What meaning was there in her phrase—"The wife of a Roman citizen?" She began to think over Ovid's idea of citizenship. Suddenly she realized, in one of those flashes that illuminate a series of facts long taken for granted, that the time he had shown most emotion over being a citizen was on the night he had left Rome, when he had insisted that he still retained his property and his rights. Before that indeed, on the annual occasions when the Emperor reviewed the equestrian order and he rode on his beautiful horse in the procession, he had always come home in a glow of enthusiasm. But she had often felt vaguely, even then, that the citizen's pride was largely made up of a courtier's devotion to a ruler, the artist's delight in a pageant and the favourite's pleasure in applause in which he had a personal share. That he loved Rome she had never doubted. He loved the external city because it was fair to the eye. He loved Roman life because it was free from all that was rustic, because it gave the prizes to wit and imagination and refinement. The culture of Athens had at last become domiciled in the capital of a world-empire. Ovid's idea of citizenship, Fabia said to herself, was to live, amid the beauties of this capital and in the warmth of imperial and popular favour, freely, easily, joyfully.

Then, on pages 138-143, Mrs. Allinson gives us Fabia's own conception of Roman citizenship.

... What did her country need, save, in manifold forms, which obliterated the barriers of sex, the sacrifice of self, the performance of duty, the choice of courage? The feverish talk of women about their independence had failed to hold her attention. Now a mightier voice, borne from the graves of the dead, trumpeted from the lives of the living, called to her, about <read 'above'?> the warring of her will with sorrow, to be a Roman citizen. She had neither arms nor counsels to give to her country. She could not even give sons born of her body, taught of her spirit. She was a woman alone, she was growing old, she was ungifted. ... But she could offer her victory over herself, and ask her country to take back and use a character hewn and shaped in accordance with its traditions. Her husband's citizenship had become a legal fable. She would take it and weld it with her own, and, content never to know the outcome, lay them both together upon the altar of Rome's immortal Spirit. ...

In the morning her uncle. . . came to see her. He looked keenly into her eyes as she hastened across the wide room to greet him. Then his own eyes flashed and with a sudden glad movement he bent and kissed her hands. "Heart of my heart", he said, "in an exile's house I salute a Roman".

Smith, Kirby Flower, an article entitled *The Poet Ovid*, published originally in the *University of North Carolina Studies in Philology* (1918). The paper may be found also in a volume entitled *Martial the Epigrammatist and Other Essays*, published in 1920, by The Johns Hopkins University Press, under the editorial supervision of Professor W. P. Mustard.

The discussion of the *Metamorphoses* is brief (68-69), but, even so, it contains several expressions that are bound to linger in the memory. One of these is that "the poem may be briefly described as the *Arabian Nights of the Roman World*". Another passage is this (69):

... <The tales> are, each and every one told with the same vividness and simplicity, the same rapidity and dramatic effect, the same marvellous command of all the resources of rhetoric, and, that which reminds us so much of Ariosto at his best, the same endearing touch of irony and whimsical fancy. He is the true story-teller. Whoever the character may be, he understands his motives, sympathizes with them, at least for the time being, and knows how to bring them out. Hence it comes that whether he relates the charming folk-tale of Pyramus and Thisbe, or the horrid passion of a Myrrha or a Byblis, we find the same sympathy, the same gusto, the same truth of nature. I know of no other long poem except the *Odyssey* in which the interest so seldom flags.

C. K.

(To be continued)

THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

One of the oldest, most persistent, most interesting, and most baffling of man's questions about himself and his world is this, How did men begin to speak? Many answers have been made at one time or another by popular or religious myth. Interesting as these are, we shall pass them over, for they have scarcely any point of contact with modern thought. Philosophers too have frequently worked out a more or less complete answer as a sort of corollary or illustration of

their systems—possibly because theory has free play where so few data need be reckoned with. These, too, we may safely pass over.

Scientific experiment is scarcely possible in this field. Herodotus (2.2), to be sure, tells of one linguistic experiment. Psammetichus, king of Egypt, desiring to learn which was the original language, isolated two babes under the charge of a shepherd, who was to nourish them on goat's milk and under no circumstances speak a word in their presence.

'When the shepherd had followed his instructions for two years, as he opened the door one day and entered, both the children prostrated themselves before him and said *bekós*, while stretching out their hands'.

Inquiry in various lands discovered that *bekós* was a Phrygian word meaning 'bread', and so the Phrygians were adjudged the earliest of men. Too bad that Psammetichus, with his extraordinary facilities for experimenting on human subjects, did not have a more logical mind and a better laboratory method! At any rate, modern scientists cannot make much use of children under laboratory conditions, and they have not been able to apply experiment directly to our question. Those scientists who have written on the origin of language have usually turned metaphysician for the occasion.

And yet, in spite of the failure of many attempts to solve the problem, certain statements can be made with a high degree of probability about the origin of language. There are, in particular, three extensive fields of knowledge from which we can safely draw inferences in regard to our topic.

(1) The higher animals express their emotions, their intentions, and sometimes their mere observations¹ in bodily movements and in sounds, and these are correctly interpreted by others of the same species. No doubt men were among the most successful of all such interpreters before the beginning of intentional speech. We may therefore get an idea of the stage out of which speech grew by observing the behavior of animals.

(2) The development of speech out of such community life as is seen among animals must have been due to human nature, essentially as we know it, minus the habits and the abilities that are due to civilization and in particular to speech. Such human nature is to be found in young children, and hence the study of children forms the second important source from which we may derive some knowledge of the origin of language. This does not mean that a child's learning to speak is in any strict sense similar to the development of the first speech; for a child learns almost wholly by imitation, while the first human speakers must have been originators. The study of child psychology and of childish speech merely helps us to eliminate some elements of adult psychology and some adult linguistic processes which have been largely developed since speech began.

(3) In the third place, we have a fairly extensive knowledge of human speech as it has existed in historical times, and we have worked out some main

factors and tendencies in the development of the historical languages. It is safe to assume that these have been operative since the beginning. Again, if all languages are found to be changing in a given direction, it is likely that prehistoric development was in the same direction, and so an inference about the nature of primitive speech may be drawn.

Of course a theory of the origin of language built up in this way will be like the first lines an artist puts on canvas. It will afford the merest hint of the intended picture, and we must fill in blank spaces with the help of our imagination; but the preliminary sketch is after all the important thing.

Nearly all the materials, except those derived from the scientific study of the historical languages, have always been available. It was merely necessary patiently to use them and to refuse to rely upon imagination until one had first sketched in as much of the landscape as he could see. It is, in fact, surplus of imagination that has made most theories of the matter rather grotesque.

On the other hand, it was the proper subordination of imagination to observation that produced the earliest satisfactory account of the origin of language. The Epicurean philosophers, no less than others, were concerned with physics, biology, and anthropology only in so far as they fitted into the metaphysical system; their purpose in dealing with what we now call science was to show the reign of natural law in the world and thus dethrone the gods. But this point of view, as it happens, disposes one to observe carefully and to interpret observations logically. Hence it is that the Epicurean Lucretius anticipated modern thought at several points. His treatment of the origin of language (*De Rerum Natura* 5. 1028-1090) is superior to nearly all that has been written since his day. What few improvements we can make are mainly due to the scientific study of language during the last century or less.

The starting-point of human speech, then, was something similar to the significant and understandable behavior of animals. Men still express their emotions by opening wide or narrowing the eyes, by distending the nostrils, by altering the position of the lips, by a rush of blood to or away from the blood vessels near the skin, by moving the arms and the legs, and by many less obvious physical changes. Less often an emotion finds expression in a cry or other vocal sound. All these characteristics must have been present in our earliest ancestors, as they are in most of the higher animals. It is likely, although hardly certain, that human song also is older than speech; if so, this was merely a highly specialized expression of emotion, not basically different from cries or laughter.

Another characteristic shared by men and many animals is a tendency to imitate sights and sounds. Both in animals and in young children imitation is usually quite purposeless. No doubt many animals are protected from their enemies by their imitation of the color about them or of the cries of stronger animals; but neither the one nor the other is intended

¹As when a parrot repeats the sounds it has heard.

as a means of protection, any more than a child's imitation of its elders is intended by the child as a preparation for the activities of later life. So primitive man no doubt crawled on his belly like a snake, ran on all fours with the gait of various quadrupeds, strutted like a turkey gobbler, howled like a wolf, whistled like a bird, roared like thunder, and so on in endless variety.

Sounds of the kinds described in the last two paragraphs have been made very prominent in some theories of the origin of language. In both classes, however, the sounds must have been less numerous and less important than the movements. Moreover, their development may antedate real speech about as far as the earliest mammals antedate man. The famous 'pooh-pooh' and 'bow-wow' theories scarcely touch the problem at all; they have to do rather with the origin of the horse's neigh and the parrot's chatter, or, at best, with the babe's cry and the child's imitation of animal cries.

Speechless man, like many animals, had gone far beyond significant behavior; he could interpret such behavior in others. Probably he knew better than we the physical signs of hunger, thirst, satiety, pain, anger, fear, etc. A crying child was given food then as now, while an angry or surly mate was anxiously humored. Lovemaking was no doubt simple and direct, certainly no less intelligible than with us. The object of a wooing by gesture, dance, and song responded with coquettish refusal and final consent as readily without words as with words; and a rival wooer, looking on from the bush, was goaded to an assault whose meaning could not possibly be misunderstood. Skillful imitation of a robin's note or a lion's roar was sure to be recognized and applauded, and applause was as grateful to the performer as it is to a modern singer. Most important of all, perhaps, a man in flight or even a cry of terror was interpreted as a sign of danger, and the whole tribe fled or cowered under the bushes and the rocks or climbed to the tree-tops. Less often a cry of rage or the licking of his chops by a hungry hunter called others to join the chase.

All this men did without any intention to communicate. The acts and sounds we have been describing were all involuntary accompaniments of emotion or mere purposeless imitation. The fact that others saw or heard and understood did not for untold ages modify the involuntary nature of expression-movement or the casual nature of imitation. The first and most important step toward genuine speech was taken when men began to do things for the purpose of being understood by other men.

It is perhaps not quite certain that this great step was taken by men and by men alone. Most people suppose that animals intentionally communicate with one another and with their human masters.

It has been noted that a hen has at least two cries of fear, one which calls the chicks to the shelter of her wings, and another which she utters when she sees a hawk and upon which she and the chicks disperse among the bushes. In the first instance, it is assumed,

she says 'come' and in the second 'run away', both times consciously giving the chicks directions for their safety. But her behavior can be at least as well explained if we merely credit her with fear for her young and for herself, which fear finds involuntary expression in cries. On any theory there are two kinds of fear, one a milder sort which sets up a desire to protect the young, and the other more violent which incites the hen to save herself by flight. Of course such different emotions find different expression, and the different cries are differently interpreted by the chicks.

Crows in a grain field are said to set a sentinel in a neighboring tree, that warns them of approaching danger. But perhaps the sentinel utters his warning cry and flies away just because he is frightened, not because he intends to communicate with the others. His staying on guard while the rest are feeding may possibly argue an intelligent interest in their welfare, or it may mean merely that crows are afraid to feed unless another crow is on guard. At any rate there is no proof that the cry is intended as a warning.

There are countless tales of how a dog has tried to tell his master of a child or of a pup in trouble, and to enlist the master's aid. But, if the dog realizes the danger to the child or to the pup and also knows that the master can help, will he not inevitably run back and forth between child and master or between pup and master and whine and lick the master's hand? There seems to be no reason to credit him with trying to tell his master anything. He is only expressing his rather complicated emotions as nature dictates. Still less does a dog or cat 'ask us to open the door' when he scratches it and whines; he is merely expressing a desire to get in. If the sound of footsteps or of a word increases the scratching or changes the tone of the whine, that registers a change in the emotional complex—hope has been added to it.

There is one gesture common to all men, but said to be found among no animals. The gesture of pointing is clearly developed out of reaching for an object beyond arm's length. This is sometimes done by monkeys, and no doubt an ineffectual reaching may attract attention to the object reached for. But only man, apparently, ever points to an object for the sake of attracting attention to it. What is true of this particular gesture is probably true of significant behavior in general. Probably man alone ever intends to communicate².

For our present purpose, however, it matters little whether the first great step toward human speech was taken by men or by some prehuman ancestors of men. In either case there is obviously a wide gap between involuntary expression-movement and movement or sound for the sake of communication, and at some time or times this gap must have been spanned by men or by animals. Of course there is no record of how the great feat was accomplished, but it may be worth while

²When a hunting-dog 'points' to the game, he is commonly supposed to do so for the sake of directing attention to it; but probably he is merely fixing his own attention upon that which interests him.

to draw upon imagination to fill in a blank space in our picture.

A woman once found a blackberry thicket laden with ripe fruit. She satisfied her hunger and then went in search of her child. When she found him she was still showing signs of satiety—contentedly stroking her abdomen, perhaps. These signs the child correctly interpreted and involuntarily he showed anxious curiosity about the supply of food which he inferred. Hitherto the mother had always led the way to the berries and had plucked them for the child, but to-day they were near by and in easy reach—besides she was languid after a full meal. So she made as if to reach for the berries, whereupon the child ran off in the direction indicated to get them. For the first time in the life of the race the woman had pointed for the sake of communication. No doubt she then lay down for an after-dinner nap, quite unconscious that she had invented a device more useful, perhaps, than any other mankind would ever hit upon.

A man had frequently when angry beaten his mate or shaken his fist at her, had read the signs of fear on her face, and had seen her submit to his will. One day it suited his purpose to cross a swollen stream, and his mate was afraid to venture into it. He realized her danger, he doubted whether she could reach the other bank, and he was not angry at all. Nevertheless he shook his fist at her in order to drive her into the water, that is, he used a gesture to give her the impression that he was angry.

At least one detail of these two supposed communications is probably typical; both were insincere. The mother pretended that she was going to pluck berries when she had no intention of doing so, and the man feigned anger which he did not feel. All real emotions and intentions got themselves expressed involuntarily, and nothing but emotion and intention would at first call for expression. So voluntary communication can scarcely have been called upon except to deceive; language was invented for the purpose of lying. When once the intent to communicate had become familiar, men no doubt renewed or intensified the expression of real emotions when other men approached. Just so children of a few years cry louder if they have an audience. Thus lying presently lost its exclusive vogue.

Side by side with the expression of emotion, which was becoming more and more largely voluntary, the imitation of sights and sounds was constantly cultivated. It must have been among man's chief amusements, as it is to this day in its more highly elaborated forms: for is not art based upon imitation? Human skill of this sort was early turned to account in decoying birds by the imitation of their cries, and in driving off wolves or elephants by the imitation of the lion's roar, that is, when men had learned to lie to one another, they presently began lying to other animals.

Once a hunter met a lion in the forest, climbed the nearest tree, and escaped with an ugly gash in his leg. Some hours later he was found by a friend and he made known his plight by renewed groans. The friend looked about for the cause of the accident, whereupon the wounded hunter satisfied the newcomer's curiosity

by repeating the lion's roar. Again a long step forward in the development of human speech! The man had communicated information as distinct from emotion! And once the idea of doing this was conceived, there was a vast store of imitative material at hand to be utilized at will.

Perhaps the next important improvement was the combination of simple elements into a complex communication. A hunter once found abundant game and, after making his way to the camp, gave the hunting-call. The others were in doubt whether to arm themselves with small stones, large stones, or clubs, and so the bringer of the news imitated the call of quail. Thereafter the hunting-call was often coupled with an indication of the character of the prey. In the course of time such combinations were felt to belong together almost as we apprehend a sentence: that is, hunting-call + quail's cry was vaguely equivalent to 'hunt quail'.

Then would follow the analogical analysis of the more elaborate of the imitations that had long been current. A man who howled like a wolf and galloped on all fours was understood to say 'wolf runs'; just as the imitation of the quail's note was the name of the quail in the model sentence, so the wolf's howl would be taken as the name of the wolf in the sentence now to be analyzed³. With this much accomplished the development of an elaborate syntax would be only a matter of time.

As intentional communication became more common, a process of abbreviation and conventionalization set in. In order to tell of the pain suffered some days ago it was not necessary to keep up the groans for as long a time as they had lasted then; one groan would be enough unless it was desired to make the story vivid. Neither was it always necessary to repeat the tone-color and the loudness of the original groans; an unemotional 'ouch' would do as well. Similarly, while cats were originally called 'mi-au-oo' or the like, they came to be called, let us say, 'mew'. Just so, significant gestures were shortened and otherwise altered until they had no recognizable similarity to the things they signified.

In the meantime symbols of all sorts took on new meanings. Certain women, perhaps, were called 'mew', and certain men were characterized by drawing a wavy line on the ground—the proper symbol for a snake. The extended open palm meant 'give', and consequently the drawn-back, closed fist came to mean 'keep' in addition to its earlier meaning 'threaten'. So a large and closely knit vocabulary was gradually built up.

Long before the vocabulary had reached the extent of the rudest of known languages, another fundamental improvement must have set in. Originally many ideas must have had two or more expressions. An elephant might be denoted by his cry, by imitating his swaying gait, by laying the lower arm along the

³Cf course the actual distribution of the elements may have been the reverse. The maker of the first sentence may have named an animal by imitating the animal's gait instead of his cry, and so the newly analyzed sentence would mean 'wolf howls'. The analysis of complicated imitations would necessarily be effected on the basis of sentences already in existence.

ridge of the nose and swaying the palm from side to side to represent the elephant's trunk, or by a combination of these. Clearly the easiest of all the symbols to make was the cry. Furthermore, the cry alone could be used in the dark or when the recipient of the communication was behind a tree or a bush. Finally, the cry alone left arms and legs free for another occupation. So sounds were again and again preferred to gestures, and presently sounds began to be substituted for gestures, where these had at first been the sole symbols in use. Thus many thousands of years ago it became possible to express as much without gestures as with them; communication came to be speech with a varying amount of assistance from gesture and facial expression.

This we may characterize as the last step essential to the origin of language, although human speech was still very unlike anything we know to-day. Many sentences were as incapable of syntactic analysis as an infant's wail or an adult's 'ouch', 'damn', etc. Some expressions incapable of analysis were probably very long, for example, groans of agony, love-songs, hymns of triumph (the last two, of course, consisting of sounds in themselves as meaningless as *tra-la-la*). Some very long expressions could probably be combined with other linguistic elements; they functioned as words, not merely as sentences.

Emotions were the chief burden of conversation. They are still the most interesting part of human life and talk, and the majority of mankind dilute them with relatively little else. Undoubtedly perceptual thinking and talking were slow to grow, since they have not yet become customary for all men.

There was probably a great deal of meaningless variation in speech. Even now our interjections and imitative sounds vary in form without corresponding difference in meaning; it matters little whether I say 'ow' or 'ouch', 'bang' or 'bing', 'ting-a-ling' or 'ting-a-ling'.

Several other differences of a somewhat more intricate character might be specified, but these are enough to suggest the limitation and the uncouthness of the earliest speech. Such a jargon could, however, change and grow precisely as historical languages are observed to grow. From some such source, we may suppose, the languages of the present have gradually developed. But that is another story.

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REVIEWS

The Esthetic Basis of Greek Art. Bryn Mawr Notes and Monographs I. By Rhys Carpenter. New York: Longmans, Green, and Co. (1921). Pp. viii + 263.

The investigation of the esthetics of Greek art is not an untrodden field, yet few, if any, have left imprints within this field which are admitted to be those of authority. Professor Carpenter's book is a welcome contribution, and written with a singleness of purpose which is especially rare in works of this sort. For

he not only says that he does not attempt to deal with matters of taste, but, what is more, he does not attempt it, confining himself to an analysis of the behavior of Greek art.

A paragraph early in Chapter I serves to show the general point of view from which he proceeds (page 5).

And therein, it would seem, lies much of the characteristic behavior of Greek art—in rethinking certain essential matters of structure, purpose, and fitness, and in reembodying them in a fusion of geometric form with pictorial illusion.

Apocryphal of modern art Professor Carpenter's emphatic presentation of the necessity of a representational content (29-51), without which art is not intelligible because the so-called pure forms are not brought to an emotional focus, leads one to wish that more would read and learn than will.

His analysis is made from the viewpoint of spatial representation, that is, he classifies the arts as they offer a one-, two-, or three-dimensional appeal to our consciousness.

We already owe to Professor Carpenter a great debt for his clever and penetrating criticism of Mr. Hambidge's theory of Dynamic Symmetry¹, but, while his book in general is an exceptionally lucid treatment of an obscure subject, there are occasions when he, too, seems to have been misled by the fascination of his theory, and to have strained a point for the theory's sake.

His exposition of a one-dimensional appeal may be a case in point. True, he is careful to call it (57) "a presentation with one-dimensional emphasis", but he hardly makes clear the distinction between this and a two-dimensional appeal. After all, a two-dimensional presentation does not depend necessarily upon an emphasis of area.

After stating the sculptor's fundamental problem (81), Professor Carpenter gives the three principal means of solution—intelligible pose, planes of composition, and modelling lines (82-90). His treatment of the first of these, a nearly equivalent expression for which is "expressive contour", is excellent, particularly as regards the torsion of the horizontal axes. So, too, is his definition of the purpose of the modelling lines (93-97), lines "whose curvature lay in the plane of the visible dimension in order to suggest a curvature in the invisible dimension".

His discussion of that very relative and unreliable term Idealism is more difficult (113), for he says ". . . these idealizing tendencies . . . are, in their origin, almost accidental inheritances from the primitive and archaic periods". Are we really to infer from this that the idealism of the Greeks was accidental? Again, a little later, he seems to claim that the idealism of Pheidias arose from the intellectualized images of the body's parts (134). True, if such intellectualization has its origin in the Greeks' insistence upon thinking and seeing types, and things as departures from types;

¹For a brief (favorable) review of Mr. Hambidge's book, by Dr. T. L. Shear, see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY, 15-62. For Professor Carpenter's discussion of the theory see American Journal of Archaeology 25 (1921), 18-36.